No Due Process:
How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional Rights of the Family Members of
Death Row Prisoners
On May 25, 2001, Shakeerah Hameen stood behind a Plexiglass wall at the
Delaware Correctional Center and watched as the state of Delaware dripped lethal
chemicals into her husband, Abdullah Hameen, as he lay strapped to a gurney. He was
killed at midnight and buried before the day ended, but Shakeerah was too ill to attend his
burial. After watching the state kill her husband, she physically and emotionally fell
apart. She developed an intense migraine headache, had diarrhea, and had a bad asthma
attack. Her blood pressure skyrocketed. Over the subsequent days she did not improve.
The asthma turned into a bronchial infection and the diarrhea persisted. Her breathing
became so labored that she could not be alone.
For three months, Shakeerah was too ill to go to work. Besides the physical
illness, she teetered on insanity, barely able to function. Although she was a devout
Muslim, she was too depressed to pray. After three months, Shakeerah returned to work,
but she was too weak to work full-time. In fact, Shakeerah never regained sufficient
strength to return to work full-time. Five years after the execution, the highly-talented
and once vital woman still struggles to maintain herself and her family.
After Abdullah’s execution, his son, called “Little Hameen” by the family,
attempted suicide with a drug overdose. His depression and anger interfered with his
ability to continue with his education. He started getting into trouble with the law and
ultimately was charged with capital homicide, the same as his father.1
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Unfortunately, these stories are not unique. Since the death penalty’s
reinstatement in 1976,2 an estimated 7,600 people have been sentenced to death.3
Researchers estimate that for every person on death row at least eight people, either
family members or close kin, are closely affected by that sentence.4 Not all of the
condemned prisoners have been, or will be executed, 5 but their families still suffer
horribly from the process of a death penalty prosecution.
Many scholars and advocates have spent years developing theories to challenge
the constitutionality of the death penalty from the point of view of the condemned person.
These challenges have been brought primarily under the Eighth Amendment, but also
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Some commentators
have even suggested a substantive due process challenge to the death penalty.6 However,
no one has yet to challenge capital punishment from the perspective of the family
members who are intimately, and tragically, affected by the punishment. This article
2
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makes the case that the death penalty violates the constitutional rights of the family
members of the death row inmates.
Part I establishes standing for the family members to sue. There is a long line of
Supreme Court precedent establishing a fundamental right to marry,7 to procreate and to
live with ones’ family members. I have summarized the holdings of these cases as “the
right to family.” This right has been articulated and protected by the substantive due
process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. As such, it is protected by the
most stringent of all constitutional standards – strict scrutiny. The right to family can
only be intruded upon if there is a compelling state interest, and even then the law must
be narrowly tailored. The death penalty interferes with this “right to family” by
irrevocably harming the family. The harm occurs even if the family member is not
executed. Therefore, anyone who has a family member charged with a capital crime
would have standing to claim a violation of his or her due process rights.
Part II sets forth the harm suffered by family members of capital defendants
giving examples of how the death penalty harms parents, children, spouses, siblings and
extended family. The harm comes not just from the prosecution of the case, but from the
greater community as well. By labeling a person as worthy of death, the death penalty
prosecution stigmatizes the death row families creating a situation whereby they
experience shame and harm from the larger society.
Part III shows there is no compelling state interest because the death penalty has
failed consistently over decades to fulfill the policy goals for which it exists, namely
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and denunciation and vindication of legal order,
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which I am calling “restoration of societal norms.” This failure is both penological and
philosophical.
Part IV argues that lesser forms of punishment, such as lengthy prison sentences
including life in prison without parole, are more narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal
of punishing offenders, without causing the tremendous and irreparable harm to the
family structure.
Part V addresses other issues such as who has standing to bring the claim, how
would it be brought, and could the theory be applied to other types of punishment.
I. The Constitution Protects the Right to Marry, Procreate and Create a Family – it
provides a protected “Right to Family”
The Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
“Life” and “property” are terms that are more or less easily described, but the more
amorphous concept is liberty. Liberty is more than just freedom from unfair
incarceration; it includes the right to pursue a life and protects certain fundamental
aspects of life, most especially the right to a family.
Family relationships are such an integral part of our legal system that family
members are allowed to act on behalf of other members of their family in situations
where that person cannot, or will not, act on his her own behalf. For example, in Cruzan
v. Missouri Department of Health, the parents of Nancy Cruzan petitioned to have life
support removed from their comatose daughter.8 Similarly, family members frequently
act as “next-of-friend” bringing appeals on behalf of death row prisoners who have
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chosen not to continue them.9 Again, this shows that family members have a legal
interest in the welfare of the person on death row that courts have consistently
recognized.
Indeed, the family relationship is such a fundamental core aspect of our legal
system that we take it for granted. In a long line of cases, stretching back nearly a
century, the Supreme Court has articulated an evolving jurisprudence that defines the
parameters of the right to family that is a liberty interest protected by the substantive due
process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
1. The Substantive Due Process Clause Protects the Parent/Child Relationship
The general parameters of this Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interest were set
out in Meyer v. Nebraska,10 a case that dealt with a statute that forbade teaching German
in public schools.11 On its face, one would not think that a law forbidding foreign
language instruction would implicate constitutional rights, but in striking down this law,
the Court used the case to set forth the liberty rights protected by the substantive due
process clause, recognizing the right to “marry, establish a home, and bring up children.12
The Court said:
While this [C]ourt has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
9
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right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry to establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of free
man. The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered
with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state to effect. Determination by
the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is
not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts.13
This seminal case gives standing to family members to challenge laws that implicate the
family, and established the supremacy of the courts to review the states’ use of police
power in those situations that interfered with the family relationship. In Meyer the
parents had standing to sue because of their interest in their relationship with their
children, and their interest in what happened to their children.
Similarly, the parents of death row inmates have an interest in what happens to
their children. Of course, the rights of the parents to make important decisions regarding
their children do not trump the rights of the state in all instances, but the Supreme Court
made it clear in Meyer that the police power must be narrowly tailored, and it is the duty
of the Court to oversee that authority to make sure that the legislative action is not
“arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state to effect.”14 As will be demonstrated later, the manner in which the death penalty is
applied is arbitrary and therefore is not a reasonable relation to the purpose for which it is
in effect.
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The parameters of the parent child relationship were explored in a series of child
custody cases starting with Stanley v. Illinois.15 In this case, a natural father, who had
raised his children from birth with the mother of the children (to whom he was not
married), lost custody of his children, without a hearing, after the mother died under an
Illinois statute that presumed that since he had not married the mother he was, ipso facto,
an unfit parent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the due process clause
mandated that Stanley be entitled to a full custody hearing.16
Stanley’s right to have a relationship with his children stemmed both from the fact
that he was the children’s biological father, but also from the fact that he had been living
with the children and raising them.17 The Court found that Stanley’s parental relationship
was entitled to substantive due process protection. Similarly, the strength of the
relationship between parents and their children, even if one or the other of them is on
death row, should be entitled to protection under the substantive due process clause.
2. The Substantive Due Process Clause Protects the Right to Marry and Procreate
In the later part of the 20th century, the cases addressing the “right to family” have
evolved largely in the context of expanding privacy rights associated with marriage,
procreation and sexuality. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court addressed the issue of
whether a state could pass a law requiring mandatory sterilization for third time felony

15

405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 657-58.
17
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia law that permitted a stepfather to adopt the
child of his wife without first obtaining the consent of the natural father, when the natural father had had an
intermittent relationship with his child but had never sought to obtain legal custody of him. Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). (“Best interest of the child” overrode a natural father’s right to block
adoption of his child when the child wanted to be adopted by the stepfather and had been living with him
and his mother for nine years).
16

7

offenders.18 In striking down the statute the Court stated, “We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”19
The right to marry, and to enjoy a marital relationship without interference from
the state, was addressed in Griswold v. Connecticut.20 In a slightly different twist, the
Court upheld the right of a married couple not to procreate and struck down a law which
prohibited a married couple from using contraceptives on the grounds that it unduly
burdened marital privacy. The Court stated that the rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights are themselves protected by “penumbras, formed by emanations” that gave the
rights “life and substance.”21 Prohibiting the use of contraceptives impeded several
fundamental constitutional rights that had a “maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship.”22 In describing the marriage relationship, the Court wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony of living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.23
The right to marry was again affirmed in Loving v. Virginia, where the Court struck down
a miscegenation statute, once again affirming, “The freedom to marry has long been
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recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness.” 24
The fundamental right to marry was the rationale for striking down mandatory
leave laws for pregnant women25 and a law that required a non-custodial parent, who was
under a court order to pay child support, to get court approval before marrying.26
The legal, and moral, sanctity of a marriage does not end just because a person is
charged with a capital crime or sentenced to death.27 A convicted offender may lose his
liberty rights to the extent that the state may incarcerate or execute him, but the state has
no interest in terminating the marriage relationship, even if one member of the couple is
on death row. The death row family member should have standing to challenge the death
penalty on the grounds that it interferes with the sanctity of their family relationship.
3. The Substantive Due Process Clause Protects the Sanctity of the Family
The Court further articulated the “right to family” in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland28 when it struck down a housing regulation that limited occupants of a single
family dwelling to people recognized as members of the immediate family. Mrs. Moore
was prosecuted for living with her son and two grandsons in violation of a city housing
ordinance, which she argued violated her substantive due process rights. The city urged
the Court not to “expand” substantive due process rights noting that nothing in prior case
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law “gives grandmothers any fundamental rights with respect to grandsons.”29 The Court
disagreed that it was “expanding” substantive due process rights, stating that:
[a]ppropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing
arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the teachings of
history (and), solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society. Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural.30
Again, the Court reaffirmed the right to family as a cherished cultural value, and at the
same time made it clear that this right did not only apply to the immediate nuclear family,
but extended to grandparents (and presumably other extended family relationships) as
well.
The Supreme Court has addressed the sometimes conflicting values between the
rights of biological family members versus those living together as a family. A decisive
case discussing these conflicting rights was the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.31 While
married to Gerald D., Carole gave birth to a child, Victoria, fathered by Michael H., with
whom she had been having an adulterous affair. For the next several years, Carole and
Victoria lived at various times with Gerald D. and Michael H., both of whom held the
child out to be their daughter. Eventually, Carole settled down with her husband Gerald
and had two other children with him.
Michael H. sought custody and visitation with Victoria, who was indisputably his
biological daughter, and with whom he had established a relationship. Under California
law, if a child was born to a married couple, it was presumed to be a child of the
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marriage, and only the husband or wife had standing to challenge the legitimacy of the
child, except in limited circumstances.
Michael H. argued that the California statute violated his substantive due process
right to a relationship with his child. The Court disagreed. In upholding the statute, the
Court looked at history and tradition as the basis for determining questions of substantive
due process. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Scalia, pointed out that historically the
family unit had been protected; whereas there was no tradition or history of protecting
biological fathers who had children out of wedlock. 32
[T]he legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria
has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices
of our society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded
special protection. We think it impossible to find that it has. In fact,
quite to the contrary, our traditions have protected the marital family
against the sort of claim Michael asserts.”33
In the cases post Michael H., the Supreme Court has begun placing more and more
emphasis on the importance of examining history and legal traditions in cases where the
parties assert substantive due process rights. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 34 four
physicians and a group of terminally ill patients challenged Washington State’s law that
banned assisted suicide on the grounds that it violated substantive due process. In
upholding Washington’s ban on assisted suicide, the Court wrote a lengthy, detailed
analysis of the history of laws prohibiting suicide and assisting suicide, and articulated a
test for determining substantive due process claims:
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Our established method of substantive due process analysis has two
primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.” Second, we have required in substantive due
process cases a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest.” Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices
thus provide the crucial “guideposts for responsible decision
making,” that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment
“forbids the government to infringe… ‘fundamental’ liberty interests
at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”35
The families of death row inmates meet all the requirements set forth in Glucksberg, and
their “right to family” should be protected by the substantive due process clause.
Conclusion
As the above cases illustrate, the right to family, which includes the right to
marry, procreate, or not, and live with family members, is deeply rooted in our nation’s
history and tradition. It is a right that is recognized by all members of the Supreme Court
from the most liberal to the most conservative. The families of death row prisoners have
rights protected by the substantive due process clause, which meet the test articulated in
Glucksberg.36 They have a right to have a relationship with their family member, be it
spouse, parent or extended family member, a right that is deeply rooted in our nation’s
history. This right has been carefully described and defined in a series of Supreme Court
cases stretching back nearly a century.37
35
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Family relationships are the powerful glue that holds together our society. Those
relationships are not diminished when one family member is no longer living physically
with the others. Children move away to college or join the service, spouses live
separately from each other to pursue careers or other interests, grandparents leave their
families to travel or live in warmer climes, but this physical separation does not make
them any less of a family member. So too, if a family member is separated because of a
death sentence, that person is still a part of the family, and the family still suffers from
the loss of that relationship.
When the state charges, prosecutes, convicts and executes a person the state is
interfering with the constitutionally protected family relationships of that person. The
constitutional remedy is not limited to those families where a family member has been
executed, nor is it limited to cases involving innocent family members. The imposition
of a death sentence, whether on an innocent or guilty person, irrevocably destroys family
life. Because a death sentence impinges on constitutionally-protected family
relationships, the government must show a compelling state interest in order to justify the
continued use of death penalty statutes.

for commercial distribution. The District Court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ case on a summary judgment
motion, but the D.C. Circuit Court reversed. The majority opinion stated that a terminally ill patient has a
substantive due process right to access experimental drugs that could potentially save her life. Under
Glucksberg, the majority described the right as “a right of control over one’s body” that “has deep roots in
common law.” Id. at 480. The dissent disagreed. It stated that there is no “right” to have access to
experimental drugs, and that under Glucksberg, lower courts have no constitutional authority to expand
substantive due process “rights.” This opinion points out a flaw in Glucksberg, which is who decides how
to define the right at stake. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of Abigail alliance, the issue of who
describes the right is not a concern with my theory, because the right to pursue family relationships has a
long history, and has been articulated in many different factual scenarios ranging from educating ones’
children (Meyer) to access to birth control (Griswold and Eisenstadt) to custody decisions (Michael H.).
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II. The Death Penalty Infringes Upon the Constitutionally-Protected Right to
Family
1. The Prosecution of Capital Cases Causes Physical and Emotional Trauma
In order to determine whether the death penalty is sufficiently narrowly tailored to
survive a substantive due process challenge, one must first determine the right to be
protected, and then determine if the government interest is sufficient to justify
interference with that right.38 Since the right to family has already been identified as
worthy of substantive due process protection, this section examines how the death
penalty interferes with those constitutionally-protected relationship.
There is not a large body of literature on the subject of the effects of the death
penalty on families, but within the literature there is sufficient research to establish the
harm done to families.39 There are no firm numbers, but one expert estimates that every
person on death row (3,373 as of January 2006)40 has on average eight significant family
relationships including children, spouses, parents, extended family and “fictive kin” (nonfamily members who are so close to the prisoner that they are in effect, his family).41
The decision to charge a person with a capital crime immediately isolates and
condemns the family members of the defendant. The stigma associated with such a
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charge causes intense hardship and irrevocably changes family relationships.
Psychologist Katherine Norgard, whose son was sentenced to death, describes the
experience as “chronic grief,” a never-ending painful saga with which most people
cannot identify, which alienates the families even further. The fact that her government
was preparing to kill her child constantly weighed on her mind. In grocery stores, at
church, or community meetings, Norgard wondered if the people she was interacting with
supported her child’s execution.42 She describes chronic grief as:
a psychic wound that will not easily heal. It is encased in shame,
hopelessness, and isolation from community support. Family members
of the condemned are marginalized when their government decrees
that the family’s loved one is dispensable and the machinery of the
death penalty begins its slow grind toward the goal of execution. The
ongoing loving bond between the family members and the condemned
becomes invisible to others outside death row.
Family members of the condemned experience repeated nightmares,
sleepless nights, difficulty concentrating, impaired short-term memory,
hypervigilance, a constant aching grief, and episodes of uncontrollable
crying. We try to avoid thinking about the death penalty so we might
go on with out lives, but intrusive thoughts plague our every hour. It is
as though we have a huge D on our forehead marking us as members
of a caste suffering from indelible despair. (Emphasis added.)43
The harm caused by the death penalty is not limited to the judicial process. The stigma
and shame associated with a capital case results in ill treatment from the larger
community. One woman said that human feces was left at her doorstep. Some people
experienced harassment at work and others at church.44 A participant in Professor
Elizabeth Beck’s study of family members of capital defendants stated:
that she only felt safe on her side of the tracks, where other lowincome African Americans lived. She was afraid when she had to
42
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cross the tracks, particularly during the trial. “I was scared too about
being his mother. Like doomed. You feel like somebody is going to
do something to you[.]”45
Beck found that helplessness was the overriding feeling people experienced. She
identified three themes experienced by all family members. “Their inability to ensure
that the defendant’s story was fully and accurately presented, their inability to address the
victim’s family,46 and their inability to hire a high-powered lawyer.”47
Many people lose the support of their friends and community. One woman said
that, “All my friends from Oklahoma just abandoned me. They didn’t support me at all
during the years, and when I came down for [my brother’s] execution, not one of them
showed any support. Not one of them called or came over, NOT ONE!”48 This woman
developed high blood pressure, migraine headaches, depression and sleeplessness.49
In addition to stigma, there is also the problem of what Norgard labels “chronic
grief.” The grief experienced by death row family members is unique because others
don’t share the experience. As Norgard wrote “People experiencing grief have support
groups available to help them. We have none. There are books and articles to read to
help people process the grief and understand their experience. . . . Poetry abounds about
grief. There is no poetry about the condemned.” Other researchers have also tried to
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Beck, supra note 39, at 408.
The rules forbidding contact between the victim and defendant’s families can create painful rifts that
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describe this experience. Some have called it “ambiguous loss” similar to that of family
members of service personnel who are missing in action.50 Researcher Pauline Boss has
coined the term “frozen sadness.” “The person experiencing this is often in a cycle of
hope and despair, due to the uncertainty of the situation. The repetitive nature of this
cycle is particularly destructive, in part because of its long-term nature.”51
Sociologist Susan Sharp compares the pain that the death row family members
experience with that of the murder victims’ family members, which in some ways is
similar but in other ways is different.
[T]heir pain is not one of immediate loss. Instead, they experience
immediate horror and a long, slow loss. Furthermore, they are
frequently treated as if they are also guilty. When asked what they
would like people to know, they overwhelmingly indicated that they
were victims and yet they were treated as if they had committed the
crimes themselves.”52
One family member, who has a brother with multiple disabilities on death row, described
what it is like for death row family members:
I see families, who, like us, live with not only the sorrow and pain of
what their loved one has done, but with an agony and profound sense of
dread as we wait our loved one’s executions. We know down to the last
detail how they will be killed; we just don’t know the “when.” We
know that we are powerless to stop it, and we wonder if we will have the
strength to bear it. I’ve heard it said that those who are on death row
will die a thousand deaths while waiting for their execution. We know
that we will also die a thousand deaths before our loved one is executed.
We know that the weight of this punishment will be borne by those of us
who will go on living. . . those of us who saw their value and knew that
they were not just garbage to be thrown out.53
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The death penalty destroys families of guilty people and families of innocent
people. Consider the story of Sandra54 whose brother was convicted for murdering his
wife and spent eight years in prison before he was finally exonerated. The children were
left without parents and when no family members could care for them they were sent to
foster care with another family. The family was embarrassed and shamed by their loved
ones’ imprisonment and death sentence. Prior to the charge, the brother had had a home,
cars and a boat, and did not qualify for a public defender. He and his parents spent their
life savings hiring two attorneys. Unfortunately, like many families of capital
defendants, they did not have the resources to hire highly skilled defense lawyers, so they
hired lawyers who had no experience with representing capital defendants, which is akin
to hiring an internist to do complicated brain surgery. After the brother was convicted,
and the family’s resources were depleted, he qualified for a public defender. His new
lawyer convinced the appellate court to reverse the conviction on the grounds that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel. The brother was eventually acquitted at retrial.
Sharp describes what it was like for the family:
The trial was difficult for all family members. Sandra was still
overseas and had to wait for the news. She had no support; her
husband would not talk to her about it [her husband was in the military
and was very concerned that his brother-in-laws’ legal problems would
hurt his career], and he did not want her talking to others there because
of concerns about his career. Her aging parents, especially her mother,
had to locate attorneys and do all the work because her sister became
too upset to do anything.
...
Upon acquittal, he was free, but his and his family’s lives were
destroyed. His children were now part of another family. His parents
had spent most of their savings for retirement on his attorneys. He was
also unable to work steadily. The years on death row had taken a toll,
leaving him with emotional problems that interfered with his stability.
54
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He has received no compensation from the state for the ordeal that he
and his family had undergone.55
Sandra’s family is not unique. Family members of death row defendants often
experience extreme health problems related to the stress of the case. One father of a
death row prisoner experienced sky-rocketing blood pressure while his wife gained 60
pounds, became suicidal and smoked so much that she ended up in the hospital with lung
disease.56 Another mother became so ill she needed an organ transplant and ended up
spending most of her time in a wheelchair.57 One sibling who attended a day of the trial
came back so emotionally distraught that “it set her back ten years.” Another sibling
whose brother was convicted developed severe depression and an anxiety disorder and
was eventually declared disabled.58 One woman, whose brother was on death row,
developed asthma, migraine headaches, and bulimia. Her mother has panic attacks,
diabetes, asthma, lupus, and depression and has threatened to kill herself if her son is
executed.”59
11 of the participants in Professor Beck’s study suffered from serious depression.
One participant described sitting in a room in the back of her house, where she
cried for hours. A third participant explained that “there have been no good days”
since her son’s arrest, only bearable days. She likened her experience to rape,
explaining, “A rape, that’s what you have been through, you feel so dirty, so
stupid, sub-human.”60
Some turn to alcohol and drugs to numb the pain. Karen’s cousin, Kevin Stanford, was
sentenced to death. The two were very close and had grown up like brother and sister.
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Both had been subjected to sexual and physical abuse as children. Karen had witnessed a
babysitter forcing a dog to sexually penetrate Kevin. This same “caregiver” forced the
two young cousins to have sexual contact. None of the information about Kevin’s abuse
was given to the jury that made the decision to sentence him to death. Karen described
Kevin’s sentencing:
My whole family watched the news on TV when Kevin was sentenced
to death. I just couldn’t believe it. I thought about all the problems he
had in his life and all the things that had never been addressed. But
that was too much for me, so whenever I thought about it too much I
just kept drinking to blot it out.61
Besides the trauma and chronic grief experienced by death row family members,
many also experience tremendous fear. In Professor Elizabeth Beck’s survey of family
members of death row defendants she found that many of them were afraid of various
aspects of the process:
[T]hey feared that the trial was stacked against their loved one, and
many assumed that racial prejudice or their social and economic
status would negatively impact the trial process and outcome.
Eleven family members feared defense attorneys or other members
of the defense team. Nine participants feared attorney incompetence.
Others feared interactions with defense attorneys because they
perceived the attorneys as hurtful and abusive.62
Some families even fear going to trial because of the threat of a death sentence if their
loved one is convicted. Families distrusted that they would get a fair hearing in court, or
in the court of public opinion. With the threat of a death sentence hanging over a
person’s head, many defendants chose to plead guilty to the crime in exchange for a life
sentence instead of risking going to trial and facing a possible death sentence. Beck and
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her colleagues documented the phenomena of capital defendants pleading to cases instead
of going to trial and risking a death sentence. She explains:
Three family members indicated that the threat of a death penalty
was an impediment to presenting the defendant’s version of the
offense, and family members watched helplessly as stories were not
fully told or correctly represented. In a patricide case, a mother
wanted the jury to know what her son’s father had put him through
in life. However, her son’s attorneys were more concerned about
avoiding a death penalty and persuaded her son to plead guilty. She
had hoped that by telling her son’s story fully, some good might
have come out of the tragedy. She explained, “Look at the families
out there that are going through something like what me and my
children went through. Another mother, whose son also pleaded
guilty, said there were many things that happened the night of the
murder that never came out and that it was the threat of the death
penalty that made it impossible to risk a jury trial. A mother whose
son pleaded guilty explained, [“]If it had not been a death penalty
case, it would have been completely different. He would have gone
to trial and had the opportunity to defend himself. Because it was a
death penalty case we had no choice but to take a plea because the
thoughts of losing him were so drastic.[”]63
Also, the high profile nature of death penalty cases often skews media coverage against
defendants. Families fear speaking to the media because they feel that their side of the
story is not accurately portrayed. Some felt that the sensationalist treatment of the case
may have influenced the outcome of the trial. For example, a single shooting at a
birthday celebration was characterized as “a birthday massacre.”64 One woman recounted
the media showing a picture following the execution of her loved one that depicted the
ambulance driver laughing as he transported the body.65
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2. The Death Penalty Harms Children
There are no statistics on how many of the approximately 3,400 people on death
row today, or the more than 1000 people executed during the modern era, have, or had,
children. Children suffer the most from the death penalty. They are the most victimized
by the death penalty because they had no ability to chose their parents, or control their
parents’ actions, yet they are dependent on their parents, regardless of how dysfunctional
they are. The State’s execution of a parent is the ultimate act of violence against a
child’s family. An execution by its nature induces extreme trauma on a child and
represents the exact type of harm states seek to protect children from through family law
and the family court system.66 Beck and colleagues described the types of harm
experienced by children of incarcerated parents: psychological trauma from parent-child
separation; difficulty establishing healthy relationships; truancy, aggression, and
withdrawal; and a decline in their social and financial conditions.67 Beck speculates that
these problems are even more pronounced for the children of people on death row.68
One particularly poignant case is that of Little Hameen, mentioned in the
introduction. His father, Abdullah Hameen, was executed in Delaware after a lengthy

66
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incarceration.69 There was no doubt that Hameen was guilty of the crime – a shooting in
the course of a drug deal. During the time Hameen was incarcerated he had been a model
prisoner. He took advantage of every opportunity to educate and improve himself. He
started a peace group that brought together citizens from the community and prisoners to
discuss important social issues. He counseled juvenile offenders against pursuing a life
of crime. Most importantly, he did every thing he could possibly do to support and love
his son and wife, including frequent visits, phone calls, and letters.
When the time came for his execution, many believed, including prison personnel,
that the Governor would commute Hameen’s sentence to life in prison because of his
extraordinary efforts at rehabilitation. Yet, this did not happen and Hameen was
executed in May of 2001.
Understandably angry, confused and deeply saddened, Little Hameen attempted
suicide. There were no programs available to help counsel him or assist him in obtaining
an education or a trade. If his father had been murdered by a person, rather than the state,
Little Hameen would have been considered a victim, and would have qualified for certain
services from the state. As it was, he was not considered a victim. He received no
apology for the loss of his father and no sympathy from state officials or anyone else
outside the immediate family. Under normal circumstances, when a child loses a parent,
that child is entitled to their parents’ social security benefits; but this is not the case with
the children whose parents are executed.70 Insecure, angry, grieving and lost, it is not
surprising that Hameen turned to street life and eventually ended up being charged with a
capital crime, repeating the cycle of his father.
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While this is a dramatic example, it illustrates that the effect of the death penalty
is not limited to the offender or the offender’s family. People can disagree about the
morality of Hameen’s execution, but his son did not deserve to suffer the way that he did.
Even if society would like to ignore his rage we cannot afford to, because it turned to
violence that affected others.
Many states do not even permit simple physical conduct between parent and
child. One mother described how painful it was to hear her daughter say that she wanted
to sit on her father’s lap, which was not permitted by the prison. The mother told Sharp:
Seeing the pain in [the child’s] face and knowing that much of the
anger she has inside is a result of her shame at having a dad that
society finds worthless enough to want to eliminate, despite her love
for him. The death penalty is so cruel and confusing to these children
who have parents on death row.71
Perhaps the most poignant story is that of a Texas mother who begged prison officials to
allow her to hold her son one last time before his execution, a request which was denied.
After the execution, they let her hold his still warm, but lifeless, body.72
Children sometimes experience harassment and threats at school. In one
particularly dramatic case, two children, the brother and sister of a capital defendant who
were in ninth and tenth grade respectively, had to leave school because the principal
feared for their lives.73 Other parents withdrew their children from school because of
ongoing painful ridicule.74
3. The Execution Creates Additional Harm to the Families
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The capital trial process is harmful to families, but not surprisingly, the execution
is especially harmful, and perhaps most harmful to the mothers of death row defendants.
One sister whose brother was executed reported that she lost her mother and her brother
the same day. Her mother withdrew from the world and was never the same again. One
mother died of a heart attack prior to her son’s impending execution; another collapsed
after her son’s execution and within a year, died of heart failure.75 Another mother was
in intensive care when her son was executed because she had attempted suicide after her
last visit with him.76 A mother, who had already gone through the experience of losing
another child, described the depression that she felt after her sons’ execution as so intense
that she couldn’t get out of it.77 Another [mother] said, “I am very mad now. I have a
short fuse. My personality is totally altered.”78
Three participants in Sharp’s survey who had already had a child die of other
causes said that their experience with their convicted sons on death row was more painful
than the other losses.79
Other family members experienced, “suicidal thoughts, functional impairment,
chronic sadness, inability to feel pleasure, irritability, and physical symptoms.80 For
some, the functional disability was complete. One mother described how she could not
do anything for years, even open her mail or pay a bill. “I lost everything… I became a
burden on my family.”81
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Participants also experienced physical symptoms such as, “the inability to control
diabetes and high blood pressure, worsened emphysema, diverticulitis, massive heart
attacks, and a rapidly spreading cancer.”82 Darlene Chambers, who witnessed her
husband’s execution, beat the glass and screamed in pain and collapsed and was
hospitalized for shock and exhaustion.83
The stress often affects the entire family unit, seriously compromising its stability.
In one family alone, the mother of the executed man died of heart failure within a year of
his execution. The sister developed high blood pressure, migraine headaches and
depression. Another sibling drinks alcohol all day long. A niece is incapable of holding
down a job because she sleeps all day long.84
III. The Death Penalty Cannot Survive a Substantive Due Process Challenge
Because it Fails to Achieve its Stated Penological or Philosophical Goals
The idea of challenging the death penalty on substantive due process grounds is
not a completely novel concept. Some scholars have suggested such a challenge, 85 and
two courts have used it as a basis for declaring the death penalty unconstitutional.86
These commentators and courts have all made the case that the death penalty violates the
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substantive due process rights of the defendant.87 Challenging the death penalty from the
perspective of the family members is a novel idea.
It is, however, a novel idea that has a strong legal basis. The “touchstone” of
substantive due process analysis is the “protection against arbitrary action of
government.”88 Professor Bentele wrote, “[S]ubstantive due process analysis dictates an
examination of the government’s objectives in engaging in activities that threaten the life
and liberty of its citizens. Only when the government can justify encroachment on
individual life and liberty by reference to compelling societal goals, does it satisfy due
process standards.”89 A rigorous examination of the modern death penalty shows that the
government encroachment on liberty cannot be justified.
To undertake a substantive due process challenge, one must first consider the
state’s objectives in using the death penalty law. One must also take into account that
“death is different” and as such is held to a higher form of scrutiny than other forms of
punishment.90 In its post-Furman jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
several interests a state may have to support its practice of capital punishment including
deterrence, 91 retribution,92 incapacitation, and denunciation and vindication of legal and
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moral order.93 At least one commentator has suggested that Justice Scalia believes that
vengeance is an acceptable rationale for the death penalty.94 However, even if true, that
belief is not widely accepted as an appropriate rationale, so, I will not discuss it here.95
Deterrence and retribution are the two most commonly cited reasons for the death
penalty.96 Even in states where statutes or the state constitution have suggested that
retribution is not a valid penological objective in a state, the state courts or legislatures
consistently have read retributive interests into the law.97
This section will examine each of the stated purposes of the death penalty –
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and denunciation and vindication of legal and
moral order, which I am categorizing as “reaffirmation of societal norms.”
Most of the discussion focuses on retributive justice because it is the theory of
punishment most central to discussions of the death penalty.98 Also, there is a large body
of legal-philosophical literature that discusses retribution theory in the context of the
death penalty.
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1. The Manner in Which the Death Penalty is practiced does not Accord with
Principles of Retributive Justice
Many justices, criminologists, philosophers and lay people believe that retribution
is a legitimate rationale for capital punishment. The central notion of retributivism is that
criminals deserve punishment, which justifies its infliction.99 Kant believed that
punishment must never be used to promote “some other good for the criminal or civil
society,” but must “in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has
committed a crime.”100 Professor Dan Markel has defined retributive justice as follows:
Retributive justice is to communicate certain ideals to an offender
convincingly determined to have breached a legitimate legal norm.
The social project of retributive justice possesses a good that has its
own internal intelligibility and attractiveness, independent of what
consequences follow. 101
Punishing offenders may have other benefits, such as deterring others, but this is not a
basis for punishment under retributivist theory.102 Retributive justice, which had fallen
out of favor as a valid penological goal by the mid-70’s, enjoyed a resurgence at the end
of the 20th century. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and former Chief Justice Rehnquist, are great
believers in retributivist theory. In his dissent in Morgan v. Illinois,103 Scalia, joined by
Rehnquist and Thomas, quoted Immanuel Kant, the intellectual father of modern
retributivists.104
Whoever has committed Murder, must die…. Even if a Civil Society
resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of its members…the last
Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the
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resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every
one realize the desert of his deeds…105
Even more moderate Justices, like Justice Stewart, believed, that if properly applied, the
death penalty served the social purpose of retribution.106
Superficially, the death penalty appears to be an appropriate means of
accomplishing retribution. However, some scholars challenge this notion. They believe
that the inequities associated with the implementation of the death penalty lessen its
retributive appeal.107 For example, scholar Thom Bassett suggests that the problem of
racial bias in the application of the death penalty in light of the McCleskey v. Kemp
decision threatens to sever the connection between capital jurisprudence and moral
theory.”108 In McCleskey the Court ruled that statistical evidence of racial discrimination
in Georgia was not sufficient to raise an equal protection challenge to the administration
of the death penalty;109 instead a defendant must establish intentional discrimination in
his or her particular case, a nearly impossible burden to meet. McCleskey effectively
made it impossible for defendants to raise issues of racial discrimination in death penalty
sentencing, and, according to Bassett, has had the result that the death penalty does not
accord with the ideals of retributive justice.
The law is a moral enterprise in that it inevitably entails thinking in
terms of a discipline that philosophers call ‘moral philosophy,’ ‘moral
105
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reasoning,’ or ‘ethics.’ The criminal law in particular is a moral
enterprise concerned with the bare minimum standards of socially
acceptable behavior. . . . As such, … the death penalty requires moral
justification. . . . [o]peration of the death penalty as sanctioned in
McCleskey cannot be morally justified within the retributivist
framework.110
There are three basic tenets that Bassett argues are required for true retributive
justice: the punishment must be proportionate, the punishment must accord with the
“dignity of man,” and the punishment must be commensurate with what the offender
deserves, i.e. “just deserts.”
The “just deserts” theory treats offenders as “moral actors” who have choice in
their actions, and punishment should flow from those actions.111 Determining
“seriousness” requires evaluating the harm done by the act and the degree of the actor’s
culpability.112 Some believe that people sentenced to death, who go through a genuine
experience of repentance and remorse, may no longer deserve to be executed.113
Bassett references several philosophers, but primarily refers to Andrew von
Hirsch. According to von Hirsch, “punishment is justified if it manifests respect for a
person, by expressing social condemnation of his freely chosen but wrongful conduct,
and if it satisfied the requirements of cardinal and ordinal proportionality.”114 Cardinal
proportionality “establishes an upper and lower limit of punishment and mandates
different punishments for different crimes in light of the seriousness of the respective
offenses.115 Ordinal proportionality requires that “persons convicted of crimes of
comparable severity should receive punishments of comparable severity. . . . It follows
110
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that punishing one crime more severely than another expresses greater social disapproval
of the first crime and is warranted only to the extent that it is more serious.”116
The idea that punishment must accord with the “dignity of man” is a principle
underlying Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. “A challenged punishment
offends the dignity of man principle if it is excessive. Examples of excessive
punishments include those that make no ‘measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment,’ or exceed the proportionality of the crime, thereby offering nothing more
than unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering.”117
Combining these three tenets of deserts, proportionality, and dignity of man,
Bassett concludes that “A contemplated death sentence is morally impermissible unless
and until it is reliably demonstrated that the offender deserves the punishment.118 He
calls his proposition “The Condition of Reliable Demonstration of Desert,” which sets
forth two principles necessary for imposition of the death penalty. “(1) A contemplated
punishment may be inflicted only after its appropriateness is reliably demonstrated; and
(2) The more severe a contemplated punishment, the higher the degree of certainty of its
appropriateness is required before it may be imposed.119
Not all retributivists support such an egalitarian notion of retribution. For
example, Ernest van den Haag120 believes that if a person deserves the death penalty, i.e.
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the person was guilty of a crime worthy of death, then the fact that the punishment is not
given to another person does not make it any less deserving of the person who received it.
To put it starkly, if the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks,
but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a lottery among the
guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would
neither make the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly
punished, despite the undue impunity bestowed on others.121
Similar to van den Haag, Christopher Meyers argues that a person selected to receive the
death penalty on the basis of racial prejudice suffers no moral wrong because he already
deserved a death sentence by virtue of his actions.122 However, as Bassett points out,
Meyers fails to consider the fact that race distorts the sentencing process so that people
who do not deserve the death penalty are sentenced to death.123
The Court, at least rhetorically, has adopted the Bassett view of retribution, not
the van den Haag/Meyer one. The Gregg Court said, “Furman mandates that where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”124
I am relying on Bassett’s paper, and the work of others, to demonstrate how
problems in the implementation of the death penalty threaten the moral underpinnings of
retributive justice. Besides the problem of racial injustice identified by Bassett, the
tremendous problem of innocent people being sentenced to death, as well as the fact that
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the death penalty is not imposed rationally amongst convicted murderers – it is not
always imposed upon the most serious offender and is often imposed on those offenders
that did not commit the worst crimes – are also reasons why the death penalty fails to
achieve the goal of retributive justice.
A basic concept of criminal responsibility is that as punishment increases in
severity, the justification for punishment must be more seriously and rigorously
demonstrated.125 Because of the finality of the death penalty, it is held to a higher
standard than other forms of punishment.126 As Justice Stewart wrote, “The penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death in
its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison sentence differs
from one of only a year or two.”127 As the following argument will demonstrate, the
current manner in which the death penalty is administered fails to meet the requirements
of Gregg, and fails to meet the requirements necessary for true retributive justice.128
A. Innocent People are frequently wrongly convicted
There have been more than 120 people released from death rows because of
innocence since Gregg.129 Statistics on exonerations indicate that there may be as many
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as one exoneration for every five to seven executions.130 These high numbers suggest
that innocent people have been executed. Indeed, according to one study, over 70% of
the public believes that innocent people have already been executed – most likely in
Texas.131 Frank Zimring, using an actuarial model examining the recent history of
exonerations, concluded that the execution of the innocent is “all but inevitable.”132
Historically, the problem of innocent people being executed has served as a strong
motivator for jurisdictions to abandon the death penalty. In 1847, Michigan became the
first English speaking jurisdiction to abolish the death penalty after it was established that
an innocent person was hung.133 Great Britain decided to abolish their death penalty laws
after the revelation that an innocent person had been executed134 while the territory of
Alaska and Canada abolished their death penalty under strong suspicion that innocent
individuals had been executed.135
Pre-modern era studies of innocence documented 23 individuals who may have
been innocent and were executed in the past century.136 The same researchers argue that
the number of wrongful convictions and executions has been underreported.137
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No one has yet been able to establish conclusively that an innocent person has
been executed during the modern era.138 However, an innocent man died in prison before
he was exonerated. Frank Lee Smith was sentenced to death in Florida for a rape and
murder for which he claimed to be innocent. The state of Florida repeatedly denied his
requests for DNA testing. Smith died in prison from cancer while fighting for his
freedom. Posthumous DNA testing established his innocence, but this did little to help
Smith who spent the last years of his life in prison condemned for a crime he had not
committed.139
Sister Helen Prejean, a nun who regularly serves as a spiritual advisor to death
row prisoners, wrote a compelling book describing her experiences with Dobie Gillis
Williams and Joseph O’Dell, whom she believed to be innocent.140 A June 2006 expose
in the Chicago Tribune suggests that Carlos DeLuna, executed in Texas in 1989, was
probably innocent.141
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has suggested that innocent people may be being
executed and pointed to inadequate representation as part of the problem.
If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some
innocent defendants to be executed. . . . People who get well
represented at trial do not get the death penalty. I have yet to see a
death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-ofexecution stay applications in which the defendant was well
represented at trial.”142

138

See Reasonable Doubt: Is the US Executing Innocent People? A report by Equal Justice USA,
available at http://www.quixote.org/ej/grip/reasonabledoubt/index.html (detailing 15 cases of executed
people with strong claims of innocence).
139
Dieter, supra note 131, at 14.
140
Sister Helen Prejean, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS, 3-144 (Random House 2004).
141
Maurice Possley and Steve Mills, Did This Man Die. . . for This Man’s Crime?, The Chicago Tribune,
June 24, 2006, available at: http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/broadband/chi-txhtmlstory,0,7935000.htmlstory.
142
Dieter, supra note 131, at 3.

36

In a similar vein, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor told a meeting of the Minnesota
Women Lawyers, “Perhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel
in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.”143
The problem of innocence has become so acute that two federal judges have
written about their concern that innocent people may be executed. In striking down the
federal death penalty as unconstitutional, U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff wrote in a
2002 opinion:
The Court found that the best available evidence indicates that, on the
one hand, innocent people are sentenced to death with materially
greater frequency than was previously supposed and that, on the other
hand, convincing proof of their innocence often does not emerge until
long after their convictions. It is therefore fully foreseeable that in
enforcing the death penalty, a meaningfully number of innocent people
will be executed who otherwise would eventually be able to prove
their innocence.144
U.S. District Court Judge Michael Ponsor, who presided over the federal capital trial of
Kristen Gilbert wrote:
The experience [of sitting on a capital case] left me with one
unavoidable conclusion: that a legal regime relying on the death
penalty will inevitably execute innocent people – not too often, one
hopes, but undoubtedly sometimes. Mistakes will be made because it
is simply not possible to do something this difficult perfectly, all the
time. Any honest proponent of capital punishment must face this
fact.145
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Convicting and executing the wrong person are not consistent with retributive justice.146
There is no rationale for killing a person who has not committed a crime. It is not just. It
is not necessary for incapacitation and it is not a deterrent.
Besides the cost of executing innocent people, there are other costs at stake in
accepting a system that permits execution of the innocent. Rampant examples of
injustice weaken peoples’ faith in the criminal justice system and breakdown the fabric of
social order, a cost that will affect all of us.
Any system of criminal justice will inevitably punish the innocent and punish the
guilty more than they deserve.147 The question is: what degree of error is
constitutionally acceptable? The current level of error should not survive a substantive
due process challenge, because the compelling governmental interests do not outweigh
the significant problems. 148
B. Death for the Most Vulnerable, not the most deserving149
Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the death penalty is to be reserved for the
worst of the worst offenders; the reality is that the death penalty is reserved for those who
have the worst lawyer and who are least able to defend themselves. 150 The common

146

“[T]he concern for accuracy in distribution of punishment is fundamentally a retributivist concern that
renders the death penalty deeply problematic as an institutional practice[.]” Markel, supra note 101, at 463.
147
Laufer, supra note 120, at 355.
148
As scholar Ursula Bentele concludes: “When a capital punishment system results, despite full
deliberation, in erroneous decisions depriving a person of life, substantive due process demands a showing
of compelling government interests if the system is to be maintained.” Bentele, supra note 6, at 1378.
149
Race plays a large role in determining who is sentenced to death and could be a large part of this section.
Because it is such a large part of capital sentencing, I am discussing that separately in section C. I have
included a separate section, B, discussing unjust sentencing practices because racial bias is not the only
factor leading to unjust sentencing results.
150
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Penalty Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994).

38

saying, “Capital Punishment means them without the capital get the punishment,” is
unfortunately true.
The death penalty has, in some sense, become largely a symbolic punishment.
Less than 1% of murders result in a death sentence, but there is no indication that of the
small number of people who are actually sentenced to death or executed that they were
the most serious offenders. Professor David McCord examined all death penalty cases in
2004 looking at as many facts as he possibly could about each death-eligible case. 151 He
identified a total of 469 defendants who met the “worst of the worst” standard. He found
that only 30 percent of those 469 had been sentenced to death, meaning that the vast
majority received a sentence other than death. Many of the 341 murderers who were
spared the death penalty had more serious cases than those who received it. Of the 2
most aggravated cases that year -- Oklahoma City bomber Terry Nichols and serial killer
Charles Cullen -- neither man received the death penalty. Of the 11 serial killers, only 5
were sentenced to death.152
Furthermore, the system fails to capture and prosecute all offenders. Many
homicides go unprosecuted. The more the system fails to prosecute, the more the burden
of the death penalty falls on a select group of people.153
While being poor and receiving incompetent counsel do not always go together,
they often do. Death rows are filled with mentally ill,154 mentally retarded,155 and poor156
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people. A truly retributive justice philosophy requires just deserts for those who are most
blameworthy, not those who are most vulnerable.
The Court in Gregg required that death penalty sentencing schemes must afford
discretion to the sentencing authority. In any discretionary system, there are bound to be
unequal results. The standard is that the “discretion must be suitably directed and limited
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” 157 The problem is
that 30 years after Gregg, we have failed to develop a system where the discretion does
not produce “wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” According to some experts, the
death-eligible class today is about as large as it was before Furman, and capital
sentencing schemes are as inconsistent as they were pre-Furman.158
Under a system of true retributive justice, all persons facing capital charges would
begin on an equal playing field and have access to competent counsel. This change alone
would go a long way in leveling the playing field, thus minimizing arbitrary and
capricious results.
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Retributive justice requires an examination of the system that actually administers
the penalty. When that system results in “substantial number of cases in which
defendants are erroneously convicted . . . or erroneously sentenced to death, the social
goal of expressing community condemnation of “the worst of the worst” is no longer
served.159
C. Racism and Geographical Disparity Play a Role in Death Sentencing
The Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972 on the grounds that the
way it was administered violated the Eighth Amendment. One of the Court’s concerns
was the role that race played in death sentencing.160 Four years later, the Court upheld
newly revised statutes that were supposed to ensure fairness. Many believe that the past
thirty years have not shown a significant increase in fairness. Racial discrimination
persists in the use of the death penalty from the charging decisions made by
prosecutors161 through jury selection162jury deliberations and sentencing. In many
jurisdictions, African-Americans are tried in courtrooms where the judge, prosecutor,
defense attorneys, bailiffs, police and jury are all white.163 One study revealed that only

159

Bentele, supra note 6, at 1385.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1872).
161
Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 327 (1988)(reporting significant discrepancies in the
treatment of potentially capital cases by county); Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal
Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1520-57 (1988)(discussing race and prosecutor’s charging decisions);
Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in Post-Furman
Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 743, 775 (1990-91)(prosecutorial decisions based
on legal factors and on the race of the victim).
162
See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, (2003); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. ___ (2005).
163
See generally Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995).
160

41

1% of the District Attorneys in death penalty states are black and only 1% are Hispanic.
The remaining 97.5 % are white, and almost all of them are male.164
Noted death penalty attorney Professor Steven Bright argues that the manner in
which the death penalty is practiced in the United States is a direct result of our country’s
history of slavery, lynching and racial violence.165 Lynchings were common until 1920
when Congress threatened to pass an anti-lynching law. Lynchings were then replaced
by trials, which were often little more than a quick submission to a mob demand. Serena
Hargrove noted:
Lynchings were increasingly replaced by situations in which the
Southern legal system prostituted itself to the mob’s demand.
Responsible officials begged would-be lynchers to ‘let the law take its
course,’ thus tacitly promising that there would be a quick trial and
the death penalty. . .Such proceedings retained the essence of mob
murder, shedding only its outward form.166
Indeed, Charles Black suggests that it simply may not be possible to administer
capital punishment fairly because of our society’s history and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination.167
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court abdicated addressing the problem of
racial discrimination in the infamous Georgia case of McCleskey v. Kemp.168 There, the
Court was presented with research conducted by Professor David Baldus that found that
in Georgia defendants were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty solely
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because the victim was white rather than black.169 In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Court
refused to rely on this statistical evidence as proof of discrimination and ruled that
Warren McCleskey would have to produce evidence of intentional discrimination, a
nearly impossible burden to meet, before he would be entitled to challenge his death
sentence on the basis of race. The Court’s decision erected a wall protecting death
penalty systems from race-based challenges.
Interestingly, even Justice Anton Scalia, who voted with the majority in
McCleskey, believed that racial discrimination did exist. He wrote in a confidential
memo about the McCleskey decision, revealed when Justice Marshall’s papers were made
public, “Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is
real, acknowledged in the decisions of this Court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say
that all I need is more proof.”170 As with the risk of executing innocent people, Justice
Scalia is willing to live with a death penalty system that risks killing based on race.
Other studies, including one by Professors Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro,
found that race played a role in seven other jurisdictions besides Georgia. Examining all
homicides reported by the FBI from Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia, the researches identified a “remarkably stable
and consistent patter of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty in all
eight states.”171
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A 1990 report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed all of the thenexisting post-Furman studies and concluded that race influenced the charging and
sentencing decisions in death penalty cases.172
More recent studies also reported racial bias. A study in New Jersey of 703
formally- charged homicide cases found that the odds of a homicide involving a white
victim would go to trail were nearly three times greater than with Hispanic victims and
five times greater than with black victims.173 In some Southern states, AfricanAmericans are the victims in over 60% of the murders, but 85% of the death cases are
cases with white victims.174
Professor Baldus has published more recent studies from Georgia that reached the
same conclusions as his original study, as well as a study in Philadelphia on all deatheligible defendants prosecuted from 1983 to 1993, which found race-of-the-defendant
bias.175 However, the Philadelphia study differed from Georgia in that the primary
source of the racial disparities in Philadelphia was from the jury, rather than from the
prosecutor.176 A study of 502 homicides that occurred between 1993 and 1997 concluded
that defendants whose victims were white were 3.5 times more likely to be sentenced to
death than defendants whose victims were nonwhites.177 A later study by the Committee
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on Racial and Gender Bias in the Justice System published by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court called for a moratorium on the death penalty due to identified bias.178
A study of all Maryland cases between 1978 and 1999 found “pronounced bias
against killers of white victims and within the white-victim cases, additional bias against
black offenders.”179 The New York Capital Defender Office reported widely divergent
capital-charging practice – 20% of the state’s murders occurred outside New York City,
but 65% of death penalty notices were filed outside the city.180
Preliminary studies of the federal death penalty showed “disproportionate
numbers of minority offenders facing federal death penalty charges as well as marked
geographical disparities in the capital prosecutions initiated in the several federal districts
throughout the country.”181 Three quarters of those convicted under 21 U.S.C. section
848, the federal drug kingpin law that provides for the death penalty, are white, but 33
out of 37 of the first 37 prosecutions brought under the death penalty provisions of the
statute were against members of minority groups.182
Some scholars speculate that African-Americans benefit from these
discriminatory patterns. They argue that since most homicides are interracial, it follows
that most black victims are being killed by black defendants. The fact that death penalty
jurisdictions consistently devalue the lives of black victims (by seeking the death penalty
against killers of white victims but not black victims) means that the black defendants
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who are most likely to be killing the black victims are spared being sentenced to death.183
While there may be some truth to this argument, it fails to explain why it is that such a
high percentage of black people convicted of killing white victims are sentenced to death
given that the majority of people who kill whites are white.
Some jurisdictions where race has not been identified as a problem have found
that geography plays a role in death sentencing. A study done at the request of the
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice concluded that there
was no significant evidence of racial bias in the treatment of offenders, but found that
there were wide geographic disparities in charging and plea bargaining practices and a
significant effect of victims’ socioeconomic status on charging and sentencing
outcomes.184
The Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) of the Virginia
Legislative Assembly also found that geography figured more significantly than race in
prosecutors’ charging decisions. “Prosecutors in urban centers were less likely to seek
death against capital-eligible defendants than those in rural areas, notwithstanding
factually similar crimes.”185
Studies show in the abstract the perniciousness of capital punishment, but what is
even more shocking is how racism plays itself out in the courts. For example, William
Dobbs, who was an African-American man in Georgia convicted of the murder of a white
man, was referred to as “colored” and “colored boy” by the judge and defense attorney
and the prosecutor called him by his first name. Two of the jurors admitted to having
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called Dobbs a “nigger.”186 Dobbs’ own defense attorney seemed to be his own worst
enemy. The lawyer made his opinion about blacks known throughout the trial. The
federal district court reviewing the case characterized the attorney’s views in this way:
Dobbs’ trial attorney was outspoken about his views. He said that
many blacks are uneducated and would not make good teachers, but do
make good basketball players. He opined that blacks are less educated
and less intelligent than whites either because of their nature or
because “my granddaddy had slaves.” He said that integration has led
to deteriorating neighborhoods and schools and referred to the black
community in Chattanooga as “black boy jungle.” He strongly
implied that blacks have inferior morals by relating a story about sex
in a classroom. He also said that when he was young, a maid was
hired with the understanding that she would steal some items.187
Dobbs is not alone. Bright identified five other Georgia capital cases where the
defendants’ own attorneys had used racial slurs. He also documented a case where the
judge called the parents of an African-American defendant “nigger mom and dad.” He
noted that around this same time, CBS fired a commentator who made a racial slur, but
the judge experienced no repercussions whatsoever188 suggesting that racism in sports
announcing will not be tolerated, but racism in capital trials will be.
Despite the fact that it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to strike potential jurors
from serving on a jury because of their race, the practice is common. A notorious
training video made by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office instructed new
prosecutors, in violation of the constitution, not to select young black women or blacks
from low income areas for jury duty because, “young black women are very bad to have
on the jury and blacks from low-income areas are less likely to convict.” The video
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instructed prosecutors how to hide racial motives in their jury strikes.189 Similarly,
District Attorney Ed Peters of Mississippi publicly announced his policy to “get rid of as
many black citizens as possible when exercising his peremptory challenges.”190 Neither
District Attorney experienced any repercussions for their illegal conduct.
The legacy of discrimination identified in Furman has not been corrected in the
thirty years since Gregg. Entrenched racial bias in the application of the death penalty
undermines the principles of retributive justice. As scholar Scott Howe wrote, “If the
State relies on aggravating evidence that does not relate directly to the defendant’s
personal culpability, the death sentence is unjust compared to the punishment imposed in
murder cases involving defendants of equal desert [culpability] who do not receive the
death penalty.”191
If the State is using race or geography as a factor in seeking or obtaining death
sentences, it is not comporting with the requirement of ordinal proportionality, and is,
therefore, not abiding by principles of retributive justice. As Bassett concludes:
Death sentences imposed in the face of a strong and empirically
verified risk of racial bias in capital cases are morally inconsistent with
retributivism, independently of whether racial discrimination actually
entered into any given capital sentencing decision. This is because
retributivism forbids exposing defendants to an excessive risk of
improper punishment and racial bias creates such a risk in today’s
capital sentencing regime. Because the McCleskey Court sanctions
systemic racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty,
the McCleskey decision is morally inconsistent with retributivism.192

2. The Death Penalty is Not an Effective Deterrent to Homicide
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Whether the death penalty actually deters homicides is a subject that has been
debated widely. Prominent criminologist Ernest van den Haag stated that “Common
sense, lately bolstered by statistics, tells us that the death penalty will deter murder, if
anything can. People fear nothing more than death.”193 Another scholar suggests that a
“common-sense” conclusion is that the fact that “the death penalty either deters or does
not deter are both speculative.”194 Interestingly, 67% of law-enforcement officials “do not
believe capital punishment reduces the homicide rate.”195 Justice Breyer recently
analyzed a number of deterrence studies in the case of Ring v. Arizona and concluded that
“[s]tudies of deterrence are, at most, inconclusive.”196 It seems fair to conclude, that
there is no clear evidence that abolishing the death penalty has led to an increase in
homicides, or conversely, that reinstituting it has led to a decrease.197
Many scholars are emphatic in their assertion that the death penalty is not a
deterrent, and if anything, may actually increase homicides. Scholars Charles Lanier and
James Acker claim that the overwhelming body of research shows “no credible evidence
that capital punishment is a superior deterrent to murder than is life imprisonment.” 198
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They cite to thirteen studies to support this assertion as well as a study by scholars
Peterson and Bailey who reviewed the mass of studies on the death penalty and
deterrence.199 Renowned scholar David Baldus claims a nearly complete consensus on
the agreement that the death penalty does not deter crime more effectively than life
imprisonment. “If there is any marginal deterrent effect from the death penalty, it is
beyond our capacity to measure and document.”200 Any studies purporting to show a
deterrent effect have been thoroughly discredited in the research community for their
“faculty methodologies and failure to stand up under attempted replication.”201
One long-time supporter of deterrence theory is Joanna Shepard, a criminologist
at Duke University. Shepard has spent much of her career researching deterrence
theories using econometric models. She had previously published articles claiming that
for every execution on average three murders were deterred.202 Shepherd has since
revised her findings after she conducted a state-by-state analysis of the homicide figures.
Her newest conclusion is that jurisdictions are too varied to draw uniform conclusions.
She recalculated the deterrence rate on a state-by-state basis and found that while in some
jurisdictions the death penalty does have a deterrent effect, in others there is no deterrent
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effect, and in some the death penalty has a brutalizing effect, increasing the number of
homicides.203 Other scholars have also concluded that capital punishment actually
increases homicides.204 However, some researchers have concluded that capital
punishment may deter other crimes such as robbery, burglary, and assault, when
executions receive a certain amount of television coverage.205
Another indicator that the death penalty is not a deterrent to murder is the fact that
states without the death penalty have consistently had lower homicide rates than states
with it. Selllin first established this in 1967 and 1980 and these numbers were replicated
in 1988.206
In 2000 The New York Times reported:
[There are] no crime trends supporting a deterrent effect of capital
punishment. Indeed, 10 out of 12 states without capital punishment
have homicide rates below the national average…while half the states
with the death penalty have homicide rates above the national
average…[D]uring the last 20 years, the homicide rate in states with
the death penalty has been 48 percent to 101 percent higher than in
states without the death penalty.207
In conclusion, there is simply not enough evidence that capital punishment deters crime
to withstand a strict scrutiny challenge. The overwhelming majority of researchers
believe that it does not. Some believe that it actually increases the homicide rate. As
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Justice Breyer concluded, at best, the studies are inconclusive. At worst, the death
penalty may accomplish the opposite of what it intends to do.
The public appears to be losing confidence in the death penalty as a form of
deterrence since a high in 1983 dropping from 63% in 1983 to 44% in 2000.208 A 2004
study reported even less public belief in deterrence -- only 35%.”209 However, a 1986
poll showed that 73% of those in favor of the death penalty would still be in favor of it
even if it were proved that there was no deterrent effect.210 Still, public perception as to
whether the death penalty is a deterrent is vitally important, because public perception is
probably a reflection of individual beliefs, and is, therefore, an indication of whether
people are deterred by the threat of a death sentence.
3. The Manner in Which the Death Penalty is Practiced and its Consequences
Lessons its Ability to Vindicate Legal and Moral Order
Superficially, the death penalty appears to be a compelling way for the state to
denounce serious crime and vindicate legal and moral order. Professor Sigler points out
that Justice Stewart in his Gregg opinion, stressed the importance of the denunciatory
rationale as being “essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal
processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.”211 Further, Stewart quotes
Lord Justice Denning: “[I]n order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that the
punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the
great majority of citizens for them.”212
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However, a deeper examination of the reality of the death penalty reveals a
crumbling infrastructure upon which no solid house can be built. The serious problems
in the administration of the death penalty undermine its ability to serve as an effective
means of denouncing or vindicating crime, or of restoring moral order.
A. There are Serious Problems with the Administration of the Death Penalty
When Illinois Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on executions in
2000, the tenor of the death penalty debate in this country changed.213 The impetus for
Governor Ryan’s unusual move was the revelation of serious problems such as the
exoneration of 13 death row inmates in a state where only 12 had been executed during
the modern era. Governor Ryan was not an abolitionist, but he did not want to preside
over the execution of an innocent person. He appointed a highly qualified, bi-partisan
commission to study the Illinois system, and come up with recommendations to ensure
that no innocent person would be executed.
After two years of serious study, the Commission produced 85 recommendations,
some of which were adopted by the Illinois legislature. 214 Significantly, the Commission
also concluded that the only way to ensure that innocent people would not be executed
was to eliminate the death penalty.215 Before leaving office, Ryan commuted the death
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sentences of all but seven people216on death row to life in prison,217 after determining that
the manner in which the death sentences had been obtained could not guarantee their
accuracy or fairness.
The same year as Ryan’s dramatic pronouncement, Professor James Liebman and
scholars at Columbia University Law School released a comprehensive study of every
death penalty appeal from 1973 to 1995.218 The review of literally thousands of cases
revealed that 68% of all death penalty cases were reversed due to serious errors at trial,
resulting in new trials or new sentencing hearings. Upon retrial, 82% of the cases
resulted in a sentence less than death, and in 7% of those cases, the defendants were
found to be innocent.219 The three most common reasons for these errors were
incompetent defense attorneys, prosecutorial misconduct and faulty jury instructions.220
Other factors that have contributed to the high incidence of wrongful convictions
include police misconduct, racial prejudice, unreliable jail house witnesses and faulty
forensic science.221 For example, serious problems in the operation of forensic
laboratories have been discovered in several locations including Oklahoma, Virginia and
Texas. The most shocking examples of laboratory dereliction came out of Harris County,
Texas, where the laboratory had been providing false DNA evidence for the last twentyfive years.222 The significance of these lab failures can be best understood by considering
that 35% of all executions in the United States during the modern era came out of Texas,
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the overwhelming majority out of Harris County.223 The laboratory was shut down and
the federal government took the highly unusual step of striking all of the results from
CODIS, the national DNA database.224
Official misconduct is more likely to occur when a defendant is represented by an
incompetent, or inexperienced, lawyer, because prosecutors and police take advantage of
their incompetence or inexperience. An example of this is the case of Glenn Ford from
Louisiana whose court-appointed trial attorney was an oil and gas law specialist who had
never tried a criminal case and had never appeared before a jury. Taking advantage of
the lawyer’s inexperience, the prosecutor withheld a series of police reports suggesting
that Mr. Ford’s co-defendants had actually shot and killed the victim and hid the murder
weapon. These reports were not discovered until Mr. Ford had competent postconviction representation. Mr. Ford, who was black, was tried by an all white jury to
which his trial lawyer did not object.225
Other stories of incompetent defense counsel abound as Charles Lanier and James
Acker note:
There is no shortage of stories involving scandalous representation
provided to indigent defendants on trial for their lives – stories
involving sleeping lawyers (Burdine v. Johnson, 2001), intoxicated
layers (People v. Garrison, 1989), lawyers wholly unfamiliar with
death penalty law and procedures (Frey v. Fulcomer, 1992), lawyers
making racist remarks about their clients (Ex parte Guzmon, 1987;
Goodwin v. Balkom, 1982), lawyers who ended up disbarred and even
223
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incarcerated shortly after representing their clients (Young v. Kemp,
1985; Young v. Zant, 1984), and lawyers lacking the experience and
resources to mount any semblance of an effective defense.226
Many death row families were seriously disillusioned with the justice system because of
the incompetence of their loved ones’ attorney. Tragically, many families used life
savings to hire incompetent attorneys only to later learn their family member would have
been better defended by a public defender. Some of their family members were
represented by attorneys with drinking problems; some of the attorneys had had problems
with ethical violations; and some were disbarred after representing their family member.
Many had no experience whatsoever in trying capital cases.227
These experiences are backed up by state studies. A Chicago Tribune
investigation of the death penalty in Illinois found that “at least 33 death row inmates had
been represented at trial by an attorney who has since been disbarred or suspended.228 A
similar investigation by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer found that “one-fifth of the 84
people who have faced execution in the past 20 years were represented by lawyers who
had been, or were later, disbarred, suspended or arrested.”229
Not surprisingly, many family members lost faith in the criminal justice system
from what they perceived to be an unfair process that their loved one endured. One
father, who was retired military who had previously had complete faith in the justice
system, lost that faith after his son’s trial. One of the witnesses testified that his son “was
near the scene of the crime in his Volkswagen – that they had to push it. And we knew it
wasn’t true because [the victim] was killed in December of 1982 and the car wasn’t
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bought until September of 1983.” Further salt was rubbed into this wound when the
prosecutor suggested that the family falsified the records. Police chemist Joyce Gilchrist
testified that the hair found proved that “[this man’s son] was in close and violent contact
with the victim.” Later Gilchrist was discredited and fired after revelations that for many
years, in dozens of cases, she had falsified evidence. The jury never learned that absolute
identification from hair examination is not possible.230
The problems in the administration of the death penalty have reached such epic
proportions that 2,000 organizations and governmental bodies have called for moratoria –
a temporary suspension in the use of executions – until concerns of fairness can be
addressed.231
A system of justice as flawed as this teaches its citizens that criminal justice does
not coincide with actual justice. It teaches contempt for the law and may impair
obedience to the law.232 It lacks the moral authority to vindicate legal and moral order.233
B. The Death Penalty Victimizes Other People Involved in its Implementation
The death penalty harms other people besides the death row families. Although
there is very little research on secondary victimization, there is evidence that juries,
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judges,234 prosecutors, defense attorneys, prison personnel,235 and witnesses to an
execution may experience prolonged trauma.236
In a recent Tennessee Bar Journal article, Senior Judge Gilbert Merritt of the U.S.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “state and federal judges agree that the judicial
administration of the death penalty is by far the most difficult, time-consuming,
frustrating and critical joint problem that the Tennessee state and federal judiciary have to
grapple with on a daily basis.”237
This perspective is, of course, not shared with all players in the system. Harris
Country Prosecutor Bill Hawkins recently wrote an article documenting how the death
penalty did not take much of a toll on the Texas criminal justice system, and concluded:
“The truth is that whatever the cost, be it financial, a citizen’s time, or the time and stress
on the trial participants, the impact of the death penalty on the criminal justice system is
worth the price.238
There is a growing body of research establishing that jurors who serve on capital
trials suffer a variety of psychological and physical symptoms. The Capital Jury Project,
a national research program sponsored by the National Science Foundation, has
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conducted in-depth interviews with capital jurors in 14 states. Researchers have
identified
one or more physical and/or psychological symptoms that could be
related to jury duty. These included reoccurring thoughts about the
trial that would keep the jurors awake at night or nightmares about the
crime and the defendant, stomach pains, nervousness, tension,
shaking, headaches, heart palpitations, sexual inhibitions, depression,
anorexia, faintness, numbness, chest pain, and hives. . . . Findings
showed that jurors whose jury panel rendered a death penalty did
sustain greater PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] symptoms than
did jurors whose jury panel rendered a life sentence.239
Steve Presson, a capital attorney in Oklahoma, has represented many capital defendants
and has, over the years, become close to many. One client, Scott Hain, who was a
juvenile at the time of the crime, was devastated when he learned that his parents would
not witness his death and did not want his remains or his property. He asked Steve to
take his ashes to Hawaii and scatter them there and told Steve that “[he] had been more of
a father figure to him than anyone else in his life.”240 Nine of Presson’s clients have been
executed, which has caused him tremendous pain. Other capital attorneys have
experienced similar stress.
Others harmed by the death penalty process are the family members of the murder
victims. Many victims’ family members oppose capital punishment and believe that it
harms them.241 Even those family members who support capital punishment are often
harmed by the process. The long and complicated appeals process, necessary to ensure
accuracy and fairness, is often characterized by repeated court hearings, including new
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trials or sentencing hearings. Victims are retraumatized by these hearings and the media
attention that they attract.
For victims that oppose capital punishment, they are sometimes treated so poorly
that they lose the status of “victim.” This happened to Audrey Lamm and her father Guss
Lamm of Oregon who requested permission to speak before the parole board seeking
clemency for the killer of their mother and wife. This request was denied on the ground
that they were not “victims” under the victims’ rights laws of Oregon.242 Felicia Floyd
and Chris Kellett opposed the execution of their father, who had murdered their mother
and grandmother. While they were given the opportunity to testify against the execution
before the parole board, the board discounted their remarks considering them to be
“supporters of the defendant” and not “victims” of the homicide.243
Another particularly extreme example of mistreatment towards a victim was that
of SueZanne Bosler whose father, a Mennonite minister, was murdered in the parsonage
where the family lived. Ms. Bosler was attacked and left for dead. She did not want the
killer, James Bernard Campbell, a young black man who was border-line mentally
retarded, to be sentenced to death; she supported a life sentence without the possibility of
parole. She begged the prosecutor to resolve the case with a plea agreement to a life
sentence, but he would not. Instead, she had to endure being a witness at trial and in
three subsequent sentencing trials. (Campbell’s sentence was twice overturned by
appeals courts because of prosecutorial misconduct.)
After a decade of litigation, Ms. Bosler was tired of being used by the state in its
efforts to kill Campbell while she was denied the opportunity to tell the jury that she
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opposed it. She hired an attorney who advised her of a way that she could legally express
her opposition to the death penalty to the jury. When she was testifying, the prosecutor
asked her what she did for work as a way to get the jury to know her and she replied that
she was a hairdresser and she traveled around the country working to end the death
penalty. The prosecutor and judge were furious with her, and the judge threatened to
throw her in jail for contempt of court if she mentioned opposition to the death penalty
again. On the third sentencing hearing, ten years after the crime occurred, the jury
sentenced Campbell to life.244

Besides the stress and strain of ten years of litigation, the

state also spent untold resources on its unsuccessful attempt to kill Campbell.
Another aspect of the death penalty that is stressful for families is that it often
causes a rift between family members who support it and those who oppose it. This is a
common occurrence, and sometimes family members are pitted against each other. This
happened with Maria Hines who opposed the execution of her brother’s killer, whereas
her sister-in-law supported it. Before the execution, the media turned their disagreement
into a major issue, pitting them against each other until there were so many bad feelings
that it created a rift which has still not healed nearly 20 years later.245 Ms. Hines, who had
befriended the killer, felt tremendous sadness and grief after his execution, and deep
sadness because of the estrangement with her extended family.246
Like Ms. Hines, Sue Norton befriended Robert Knighton (known as BK) who
killed her father and stepmother and spoke publicly against his execution. Her sister
supported the execution. Their disagreement became the focus of many media stories.
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After all his appeals failed, Mrs. Norton witnessed BK’s execution, at his request. The
stress of BK’s execution made Mrs. Norton, a cheerful and optimistic person, stressed
and tearful. After the execution, she reported,
“I am just trying to maintain. . . I bawled all the way home the other
day and Gene [her husband] listened to me talk for two hours. He has
been so good. I have not been out of the house since. I was supposed
to go to the store and do some errands this morning, but did not go. I
hate leaving the house alone.”247
The stress was compounded by the fact that she and her sister disagreed with each other,
which became a big part of the story of BK’s execution.248
Johnnie Carter witnessed the execution of the man who killed her granddaughter.
She did not condone his crime, but she opposed his execution. At her request, she met
the man in prison and he answered questions about the murder for her. When he asked
her to witness the execution, she agreed. “It took my breath away,” she said of the
experience. After the execution, the family members who supported the execution were
escorted to an area inside the prison for a press conference, but Ms. Carter was told to go
outside into the cold rainy night.249
By harming others involved in the process, especially the victims’ family
members, the death penalty loses much of its moral authority. Any benefit to society
inured from the death penalty is outweighed by its negative impact -- creating rifts within
families, re-traumatizing victims, and traumatizing jurors, judges and prison personnel.
In the effort to restore moral order, the death penalty creates other moral problems.
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C. The High Cost of the Death Penalty Lessens its Ability to Serve as an Effective
Denunciation or Vindication of Legal and Moral Order
The cost of capital punishment may not be an appropriate area of discourse in
discussions of morality. If capital punishment were working as a deterrent and were
applied fairly, the cost of carrying out the punishment should be of little concern.
However, given that the death penalty is not serving the social goals, the fact that it also
costs significantly more than other punishments should be a concern when considering
whether it is an appropriate way to denounce violence and vindicate social order.
It is difficult to obtain precise figures, and the costs vary significantly between
jurisdictions, but several studies have concluded that death penalty systems demand
significantly more resources than jurisdictions where life imprisonment is the maximum
punishment. 250 Some numbers that are particularly noteworthy are that each execution in
North Carolina (when you consider the total costs involved) exceeds $2 million.
California taxpayers could save $90 million a year by abolishing the death penalty.
Several country budgets have been bankrupted by the cost of bringing capital cases.251
Despite the millions spent (or misspent) on capital punishment, there is little
return for the money. As Lanier and Acker explain:
Ironically, though, the considerable financial investments incurred in
virtually all capital prosecutions produce a modest return in the form
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of executions. Only about half of trials in which a death sentence is
sought result in conviction for a capital crime and a sentence of death.
Even in cases in which death sentences are imposed, later judicial
review results in as many as two out of three capital convictions and/or
sentences being vacated. The great majority of offenders thus will end
up serving lengthy prison sentences, even though huge sums of money
were fruitlessly spent pursuing their execution. These extra costs are
not a factor in systems in which life imprisonment is the maximum
punishment.252
Based on calculations of the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission, the
average death penalty case from trial to execution (using 10 years in prison as a
calculation – many prisoners are in much longer before execution) was $667,560,
whereas the typical life-without-parole case from trial to death (using 47 years in prison
for calculations) where a death penalty was never sought was $551,016. This means that
even including the costs of 47 years in prison (which is much longer than most prisoners
survive in prison) was still $116,544 less expensive than a death case which included an
estimating 47 years in prison.253 This figure does not include any expenses incurred
when capital convictions are vacated in collateral proceedings, on appeal or upon federal
review, and remanded for further proceedings, all of which are frequent occurrences.
Between the period of 1986 and 2005, 35% of all Indiana death row defendants had their
cases remanded to trial court for further proceedings.254
4. The Death Penalty is not necessary to Incapacitate Offenders
There is no arguing with the fact that executing an offender incapacitates him or
her. However, with today’s modern penal system, it is not necessary to execute an
offender to accomplish the goal of incapacitation. Every state, and the federal
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government, has high security prisons, which keep dangerous offenders from escaping or
killing while incarcerated. While escapes and prison murders do happen, they are rare.
The public has a legitimate interest in the concern that a convicted killer, if
released, may kill again. But the rate of recidivism among released murderers is
extremely low,255 and in any event, most defendants who are not sentenced to death are
sentenced to life without parole, which Justice Breyer has suggested is a sufficient
punishment alternative to ensure an offender does not commit further crimes.256
Furthermore, it is hard to argue that the death penalty is necessary to incapacitate
murderers when the overwhelmingly majority of people who commit homicide are not
sentenced to death. Of the estimated 6,300 people sentenced to death since 1976, only
1,012 of them have been executed.257 Researchers estimate that only 2.2% of offenders
arrested for murder are sentenced to death.258 Of the 21,000 homicides a year, only 300
are sentenced to death, and an even smaller number, well less than 100 most years, are
actually put to death. While not all of the 21,000 homicides would have been death
eligible, many of them would have been.
Short of a mandatory death penalty, which the Supreme Court has declared
unconstitutional, there will always be discrepancies and inconsistencies in death
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sentencing. 259 However, the point is that the death penalty is so infrequently used that is
has become more symbolic than normative. It is difficult to argue that the death penalty
is a necessary means of incapacitating murderers when so few of them are actually
subjected to it.
IV. Any Legitimate Criminal Justice Interests a State May Have in Using the Death
Penalty are not sufficiently narrowly Tailored to Survive a Strict Scrutiny Analysis
A substantive due process challenge requires balancing the states’ interests
against the rights of the individual. In this case, the harm caused to the families cannot
be justified by the death penalty because it has failed so completely to live up to the goals
for which it exists. The manner in which the death penalty is practiced does not comport
with its stated criminal justice goals such as deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and
restoration of social order. To the extent that it does accomplish these goals, “the
infringement is [not] narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”260 Under
Glucksberg, the government may not infringe on “fundamental’” liberty interests at all,
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.”261 Strict scrutiny further requires that state action limiting
the exercise of a fundamental right must be the least restrictive means to serve that end.262
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The death penalty for the sake of retribution falls short of meeting that goal
because of the numerous problems with the way it is practiced that make it an essentially
unfair punishment. The problem of wrongful convictions and the possible execution of
innocent people severely diminishes the death penalty as a form of retribution. Inevitably
innocent people will be executed. The state’s legitimate interests in punishing murderers
cannot be justified by killing innocent people, when other acceptable forms of
punishment are available. Indeed some scholars believe that the twin requirements of
individualized sentencing and eliminating arbitrariness in sentencing cannot be
reconciled.
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Justice Blackmun ultimately came out against the death penalty because

of his skepticism that the two goals could ever be reconciled, and his belief that if the two
goals could be reconciled, the Supreme Court had failed to do so. He wrote:
[E]ven if the constitutional requirements of consistency and fairness
are theoretically reconcilable in the context of capital punishment, it is
clear that this Court is not prepared to meet the challenge. In apparent
frustration over its inability to strike an appropriate balance between
the Furman promise of consistency and the Lockett requirement of
individualized sentencing, the Court has retreated from the field.264
As regards to the death penalty as a form of deterrence, too many studies indicate
that the homicide rate “bears no relation to the existence or non-existence of capital
punishment.265 The uncertainty surrounding the deterrence debate, suggests that it cannot
pass a strict scrutiny challenge. Additionally, the fact that some research indicates that
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the death penalty may have a brutalizing effect, strengthens the argument that the death
penalty as a deterrent cannot survive a strict scrutiny challenge.
The death penalty’s strongest policy argument is that it is an effective means of
incapacitation. However, a strict scrutiny analysis requires that the state use the most
narrowly-tailored means to accomplish its goal. Given the availability of modern penal
systems, and lengthy prison terms such as life in prison without parole, the state’s
justification for using the death penalty as a means to incapacitate prisoners is no longer
valid.
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Further, in the unlikely event that a person convicted of first-degree murder

would ever be released from prison, a number of studies have established that convicted
murderers have a lower recidivism rate than other criminals.267
I would argue that the death penalty falls so short of the mark of accomplishing its
stated goals that it does not even pass a rationale based scrutiny, let alone a strict scrutiny
standard.268 However, even if some believe otherwise, that the death penalty does
accomplish its stated goals, it still does not pass the second part of the strict scrutiny test,
which requires that the penalty be narrowly drawn. Alternatives to the death penalty are
certainly available and can accomplish the states’ goals of deterring, punishing,
incapacitating and restoring moral order, perhaps even better than capital punishment
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does.269 Given the myriad of problems involved in capital punishment, we should not
have a “perfect” punishment, where the penalty is irrevocable, when we have an
“imperfect system.”270
V.

Who, What, When and How -- the practical aspects of the theory.
There are a number of questions that are obviously raised by this substantive due

process argument such as who can bring this challenge, how do they bring it, and could
the theory be applied to other types of punishment. I will address these questions
generally.
Who Can Bring the Claim?
It is not my intention that this argument would be raised by the defendant at a
sentencing hearing. If there is one point I am trying to make, it is that family members of
people on death row have constitutional rights protected by the Due Process Clause that
are entirely separate from those of the defendant. Some may argue that this challenge is
unfair to the death row prisoner who has no family members. This is true. I can only
reiterate what I already stated, that the right I am discussing is for the family member, not
for the prisoner.
The Supreme Court has already ruled that the Due Process Clause protects certain
family relationships including parent child (Meyers and Stanley), spouses (Griswold,
Loving, and Michael H.), and grandparents and extended families (Moore v. City of East
Cleveland). Presumably anyone who is in the immediate family such as spouses, parents
or children, or close extended family such as grandparents, cousins or aunts and uncles,
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would have standing to bring a suit enjoining the prosecution of a capital case on the
grounds that it interferes with their constitutionally-protected right to family.
Challenging Other Types of Punishment
The next obvious question is should a family member have standing to challenge
any type of punishment, even a prison term. The answer to that question is, it depends.
On the one hand, death is different in kind from every other form of punishment. As
former Justice Brennan wrote in Furman, “In comparison to all other punishments
today… the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to
human dignity.”271 No other punishment completely severs the family relationship.
Because death is different, the state is under an obligation to show that the harm
done to the family can be justified for other legitimate purposes. Because the death
penalty so completely fails to meet its policy goals, and it causes extreme harm to
families, it cannot survive a strict scrutiny analysis. It is far easier to imagine eliminating
the death penalty than it is to imagine eliminating prisons altogether.272
A substantive due process attack on other forms of punishment would be more
difficult to make because the degree of arbitrariness acceptable in death sentences should
be less than in other forms of punishment.273 Further, one hopes that other forms of
punishment are more narrowly drawn so that they are not so manifestly unfair as the
death penalty. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case. There are other forms of
punishment that severely interfere with the family relationship, and that may not
withstand a strict scrutiny challenge. The example that springs to mind is a challenge to
some of the excessive and draconian punishments for drug crimes, where the state does
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not get any great benefit from sentencing drug offenders to lengthy terms, but there is a
tremendous harm to the families.
Can the State remedy the Harm Caused by Providing Services to the Families?
The state could reduce the harm to the death row families by providing services
such as therapy, counseling, and economic assistance. Most states offer some type of
service to homicide victims, and these statutes could be used to provide similar assistance
to people whose family member was a victim of state-sponsored homicide. This would
have been helpful to the family of Abdullah Hameen, especially to his son, who had he
had the benefit of counseling or vocational assistance, may not have ended up in prison.
However, this type of assistance does not go far enough. Just as no punishment will ever
restore the victims’ family to wholeness, no amount of state assistance will restore the
family members of the prisoner for the harm caused by the death penalty.
Viability of the Claim
Courts may be reluctant to entertain this type of claim because it is so novel.
However, the argument is grounded in long-held constitutional principles and should be
sufficient to give family members standing to bring suit. If a court refuses to entertain
the claim, it will likely be not because the claim lacks solid legal footing, but because
there is political fear of the repercussions of attacking the death penalty in this manner.
Conclusion
In its’ per curium opinion striking down the death penalty in 1972, the connecting
thread of the five separate opinions was the principle that punishment must be rational.
The Court determined that the manner in which the penalty was applied was so arbitrary,
discriminatory, and irrational, that it violated both the Eighth Amendment and the Due
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Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.274 Assuming arguendo that
states have legitimate penological interests in using the death penalty, those interests are
not sufficient to withstand a strict scrutiny analysis.
Families of death row defendants suffer infringement of their constitutional right
to family when the death penalty is used. The harm occurs not just from the execution,
but from the charging and prosecution of the case as well. The right to family is a longestablished fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. This right to family is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”275 Further, is has been carefully described
through jurisprudence.
The death penalty does not serve the compelling interests for which it supposedly
exists – to deter crime, to incapacitate offenders, to restore moral order, and to serve as a
form of retribution. Even if it serves those interests, it is not the least restrictive means
available to do so. A lengthy prison sentence, including life in prison, serves the same
goals better and does not create the harm to the families caused by the death penalty.
Because of the fundamental nature of this right, the government may not infringe
upon it unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The death penalty is not narrowly tailored because it fails to accomplish its purported
penological interests of deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and restoration of moral
order. There are other punishments available, namely lengthy incarceration, including
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life in prison without parole, that better accomplish the penological goals and do not
destroy completely the family relationship.
It is time for courts to recognize the constitutional right of death row family
members to preserve and protect their family relationships.
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